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In August 1995, the South Centre was established as a permanent inter-
Governmental organization of developing countries. In pursuing its objectives of 
promoting South solidarity, South-South cooperation, and coordinated participa-
tion by developing countries in international forums, the South Centre has full in-
tellectual independence. It prepares, publishes and distributes information, strategic 
analyses and recommendations on international economic, social and political mat-
ters of concern to the South. 
 
The South Centre enjoys support and cooperation from the governments of 
the countries of the South and is in regular working contact with the Non-Aligned 
Movement and the Group of 77. The Centre’s studies and position papers are pre-
pared by drawing on the technical and intellectual capacities existing within South 
governments and institutions and among individuals of the South. Through work-
ing group sessions and wide consultations which involve experts from different 
parts of the South, and sometimes from the North, common problems of the South 














Paragraph 8 of the Sao Paulo Consensus adopted at UNCTAD XI held in Sao Paulo 13-18 
June 2004, states: “The increasing interdependence of national economies in a globalizing 
world and the emergence of rule-based regimes for international economic relations have 
meant that the space for national economic policy, i.e. the scope for domestic policies, espe-
cially in the areas of trade, investment and industrial development, is now often framed by 
international disciplines, commitments and global market considerations. It is for each Gov-
ernment to evaluate the trade-off between the benefits of accepting international rules and 
commitments and the constraints posed by the loss of policy space. It is particularly impor-
tant for developing countries, bearing in mind development goals and objectives, that all 
countries take into account the need for appropriate balance between national policy space 
and international disciplines and commitments.” 
 
The Doha Plan of Action, adopted by the Second South Summit organized by the Group of 
77, held in Doha, Qatar, 12-16 June 2005, requested UNCTAD and the South Centre to ex-
plore “through their research and analytical work ways and means to operationalize the con-
cept of policy space in international economic relations including in all relevant international 
and multilateral forums”. 
 
This brief study which focuses on the concept of “policy space for development” in relation 
to the multilateral trading system is an attempt to introduce some conceptual and methodo-
logical clarity into this matter. As such it should be of assistance to developing countries as 
they struggle to implement national policies that protect and support the development of 
their domestic industries and diversification of their economies, and to have these develop-
ment priorities reflected in international agreements and global regimes, which are often 
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With the increasing political and economic integration that accompanies globalisation, a growing 
number of international agreements now restrict the national ‘policy space’ of developed and develop-
ing countries alike. In order to assess the impact of international agreements on policy space, it is in-
structive to examine national policy space as a sub-space of the universe of policy options available to 
a country in an ideal world without policy constraints. From such an examination, this paper illustrates 
how domestic ‘endogenous’ constraints and international ‘exogenous’ constraints may significantly 
restrict a country’s access to national policy space for development. Sources of endogenous and ex-
ogenous constraints are reviewed, and ways that international environmental, social and economic 
agreements can both reduce and extend national policy space are outlined. 
 
The paper demonstrates how developing countries’ national policy space is affected by agree-
ments comprising the Multilateral Trading System (MTS) under the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Focus is given to examining the narrowing range of policy options permissible under interna-
tional trade and finance agreements, and the adverse effects this can have on countries in earlier stages 
of economic development. This contraction of policy space has recently been identified as a concern in 
international trade negotiations. In particular, agreements within the WTO contain provisions, and 
economic assistance arrangements of international financial institutions include conditionalities, that 
prohibit developing countries from implementing a range policy interventions designed to stimulate 
the growth, industrial development and diversification of their national economies. These effects are 
reviewed with the finding that the playing field resulting from international trade agreements that have 
ostensibly equivalent rules for all contracting parties, may provide a much smaller policy space for 
developing than developed countries because of differences in initial conditions and national policy 
implementation capacities. Efforts to establish a level playing field for international trade must recog-
nise and address this disparity.  
 
After assessing the scope of policy space accessible to developing countries, the paper suggests 
what can be done at national and international levels to ensure that available policy space is effectively 
utilised, and when existing space is insufficient to advance national development objectives, it exam-
ines ways to expand policy space in a manner that is consistent with developing countries’ existing 
WTO commitments. It is argued that special and differential treatment (S&DT) for developing coun-
tries under the MTS needs to be enhanced and made more actionable and effective in order to provide 
developing countries with essential national policy space for development. Finally, general areas 
where improved S&DT is needed, and should be pursued by developing countries in the ongoing Doha 
Round of WTO negotiations, are summarised.  
 






The development process of all countries is centred on increasing economic output to boost national 
income to higher levels so that national employment and consumption needs can be met. Within this 
process, the government plays a unique and central role in establishing a national policy framework 
designed to build human, technological and infrastructural capacities required to increase and diversify 
production and output; foster enterprise formation and growth; and manage the economic, social and 
environmental externalities of the development process as it proceeds.  
 
As one of their primary functions, governments are therefore preoccupied with identifying, de-
veloping, implementing and assessing national policies to advance these development objectives. 
However, in a world with limited human and financial resources and growing democratic forces that 
support and reject policy choices, substantial national policy constraints arise. At the same time, na-
tional policy formulation takes place against a rich backdrop of interactions with other countries pur-
suing similar development objectives. With the march towards globalisation in recent decades, interna-
tional agreements designed to manage these interactions between states have introduced a layer of ‘in-
ternational’ policies – transmitted to the national level by commitments and obligations under interna-
tional agreements – to be respected by the national policymaking process and thereby posing addi-
tional constraints on national policy choices. 
 
The proliferation of international agreements during the past decades has evolved in step with 
the increasing globalisation of the world economy and a climate of improving cooperation and in-
creased economic interdependence among nations. International agreements are viewed by adherents 
as necessary, because clear game rules are needed to ensure fair and equitable interactions between 
states, and desirable, because they provide various benefits, assurances and predictability that can only 
come from global cooperation. It is precisely for these reasons that they are subscribed to. However, as 
their scope deepens and numbers multiply, many countries are finding that they significantly constrain 
national policymaking. 
 
In this era of increasing global governance, governments actively seek to secure a maxima of 
benefits in global agreements while at the same time maintaining as much policy space as possible in 
order to adopt, and adapt as needed, domestic policies that best serve national interests. Strategies to 
achieve these often conflicting objectives underlie national negotiating positions in the elaboration of 
international agreements. However, maximising national flexibility under multilateral agreements is 
not a simple exercise because global governance necessarily limits what states can and cannot do, 
sometimes in draconian ways. It is a complex process, simultaneously affecting interactions between 
countries across various institutional domains in ways that challenge concepts of national sovereignty 
and autonomy (Chayes and Handler Chayes, 1995; Mortensen, 2000). Global governance is thus 
prompting a redefinition of national political space wherein national sovereignty and autonomy are 
progressively displaced by global governance systems from their traditional placement within the na-
tional community and the territorially bounded nation-state (Held and McGrew, 1994).  
 
The narrowing set of national policy options permissible under a growing array of international 
agreements is increasingly referred to in international debates as a major constraint on national policy 
space. In negotiations of the Eleventh United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 2004, 
this issue, and the associated issue of building greater coherence between national and international 
policy regimes, were topics of considerable intergovernmental debate (UNCTAD, 2004). The success 2 South Centre T.R.A.D.E. Working Papers 
 
 
of current World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations also hinge on whether members perceive 
that their national policymaking abilities are sufficiently preserved.  
 
Why is the trade-off between national policymaking autonomy and increased global governance 
necessary? What provisions have been made to account for the special needs and priorities of develop-
ing countries within international agreements? Do such provisions provide sufficient policy space re-
quired by developing countries to advance their development objectives? These are some of the ques-










   
At both the national and international levels, the mechanics of policymaking are fairly straightforward. 
A problem or opportunity is identified and policies are designed to effect a response by stakeholders to 
resolve the problem, or share the opportunity, in an equitable manner reflecting their particular respon-
sibilities, capacities and needs. What is less clear is how national and international policies should be 
designed in a mutually supportive way that does not overly restrict national policy space. In order to 
address this broad question of policy coherence, a conceptual overview of how national policy con-
straints manifest is useful. 
 
Access to development enhancing policy options varies considerably among countries due to 
their own national policy constraints. These constraints result from inadequate financial, human, insti-
tutional and infrastructural resources needed to implement desirable development objectives. In many 
developing countries, the sustainability of policies vis-à-vis these resource bases cannot be ensured 
over the time period of implementation needed to achieve policy objectives. Financial and infrastruc-
ture constraints are prevalent in developing countries with high debt servicing requirements that leave 
limited funds available for government expenditures (UNDP, 1999). Furthermore, in many developing 
countries, particularly LDCs, human and institutional resources remain insufficient to satisfy policy 
implementation, monitoring and assessment requirements.  
 
National policy constraints also arise from limits to policy acceptability by national stake-
holders. For example, the latter may oppose policies that raise taxes, strengthen environmental regula-
tions or liberalise trade in sensitive sectors. But even in cases where national capacities and acceptabil-
ity by a vast majority of stakeholders are sufficient to introduce and implement welfare improving 
policies, the latter may never be realised due to unresponsive political leadership, resource diversion to 
vested interest groups, or a simple lack of political commitment to reform. Such situations remain as 
persistent problems in many developing countries where democratic political systems are absent or 
newly emerging (Van de Walle, 1999; Hyden, 2002; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2002). As shown in 
Figure 1, these national, or endogenous constraints, form a boundary limiting the extent of ‘endoge-
nous policy space’ within a larger universe of possible policy options. And because the ‘size’ of this 
endogenous policy space is proportional to the magnitude of available resources, i.e., the level of a 
country’s economic development, developed countries possess a considerably larger endogenous pol-
icy space than developing countries.  
 
In addition to domestic or endogenous constraints, various international or exogenous con-
straints limit a country’s ‘exogenous policy space’. Foremost among these is the requirement that do-
mestic policies do not conflict with national commitments and obligations assumed under various mul-
tilateral agreements – global, regional, sub-regional, and bilateral – on economic, social and environ-
mental issues. There are many instances of exogenous policy constraints resulting from international 
agreements. For example, to meet agreed commitments to limit emissions of greenhouse gases under 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), developed countries’ na-
tional energy policy options are restricted to a subset of options within a larger set of otherwise na-
tionally acceptable options.
1 Or, in conformance with WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), mem-
                                                 
1 Under the Convention, only developed countries have accepted commitments to limit their emissions to nu-
meric targets. Because few met these targets, which were not legally binding, Parties to the UNFCCC elaborated 
a protocol to the convention – the Kyoto Protocol – to strengthen developed countries commitments and make 
them legally binding. Adopted in 1997, the Protocol has yet to secure sufficient ratification for its entry into 
force.  4 South Centre T.R.A.D.E. Working Papers 
 
 
bers’ national policies options to subsidise agricultural producers are reduced, while under the Agree-
ment on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM), national policies to subsidise industrial pro-









Together, endogenous and exogenous constraints define the size of a country’s ‘effective national pol-
icy space’ which is shown conceptually in Figure 2 as the grey region of overlap of permitted ‘en-
dogenous’ and ‘exogenous’ policy space. Specifically, as shown in Figure 2, international agreements 
(i.e., exogenous constraints) define one boundary (boundary A) of governments’ national policy space, 
while national conditions (i.e., endogenous constraints) define the other (boundary B). Figure 2 also 
illustrates how the size of countries’ effective national policy space can vary over time as endogenous 
conditions change. For instance, as a country’s level of development increases, or as economic activity 
steps up, the endogenous policy space boundary (B) often expands, augmenting the size effective na-
tional policy space. Alternatively, declining economic performance usually forces this boundary to 
contract, reducing the size effective national policy space. In contrast, exogenous policy space bounda-
ries (A) delineated by international agreements generally do not expand. Rather they tend to contract 
as the scope of international agreements widens and/or their number increases over time. The net re-
sult for most developing countries is that the extent of their effective national policy space shrinks 




Endogenous policy space (devel-
oping country) 
Universe of policy options 
 
Endogenous policy space is the 
set of accessible policy options 
under endogenous constraints 









Figure 1 : Countries’ endogenous policy space as subset of possible policies in the policy 
universe. The size of this space, which depends on the availability of domestic resources 
and the level of the country’s economic development, is larger for developed countries and 
smaller for developing countries. Expanding National Policy Space for Development: Why the Multilateral Trading System Must Change   5 
 
 
Although under the application of a multilateral agreement all countries may be subject to act 
within an equivalent exogenous policy space
2, developing countries may not have sufficiently ex-
tended endogenous policy space to access much of the allowed exogenous space. As a result, their ef-
fective national policy space may be considerably smaller than that of developed countries. This is 
shown schematically in Figure 3. An agreement’s provision of extended policy space for developing 
countries may thus be essential to ensure their economic competitiveness and attainment of national 
development goals vis-à-vis developed countries. When adequate policy space extensions (regions a 
and b in Figure 2) are provided through ‘enabling mechanisms’, developing countries in need of re-







To maintain simplicity and broad applicability, international agreements necessarily generate policy 
constraints related more to the conditions within a standard model of the ‘generic’ state contracting to 
an international agreement, than to the national conditions particular to any one state. However, to ad-
dress the particular conditions of developing countries, most multilateral agreements contain special 
provisions for enabling mechanisms which take into account their specific needs, development priori-
ties and limited implementation capacities. How useful such provisions are varies from one agreement 
to another and ultimately depends on the effectiveness of developing countries in advancing their ne-




                                                 
2 This is not always the case. Some WTO agreements provide a larger exogenous policy space to developed 
countries than developed countries. Box 1 provides details on how the WTO Agreement on Agriculture provides 
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Figure 2 : Determinants of effective national policy space under multilateral agree-
ments. Both contractions and extensions of effective national policy space are possible 




Many multilateral agreements include enabling mechanisms that provide developing countries with 
enhanced endogenous and/or exogenous policy space. In order to allow developing countries to ad-
vance development objectives, agreements may allow them to benefit from an exogenous policy space 
boundary that extends beyond the limits placed on developed country parties (region a in Figure 2). 
While through technical and financial assistance programs, agreements may extend endogenous policy 
boundaries to permit countries with limited capacities, to implement policies and corresponding meas-
ures and actions that would otherwise be beyond their national capacities (region b in Figure 2). Spe-
cial and Differential Treatment within the Multilateral Trading System (MTS) is example of an ena-
bling mechanism that extends, to a defined extent, both exogenous and endogenous policy space for 
developing countries.  







Universe of policy options 
 
 
Due to differences in their endogenous capaci-
ties, the effective national policy space of a 
developed country (region 1+2) may be sig-
nificantly larger than that of a developing coun-
try (region 1 only) under a common set of ex-
ogenous constraints imposed on each by a multi-
lateral agreement. 
Endogenous policy space 
(developing country) 
Endogenous policy space 
(developed country) 
Figure 3 : Developed and developing countries’ effective national policy 
space under a uniformly applied exogenous constraint.  
 
III.  M ULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON NATIONAL POLICY 
SPACE 




Which multilateral agreements restrict national policy space and which extend it? Agreements de-
signed to resolve social, political and environmental problems call on parties to adopt specific policies 
and timetables with the objective of promoting actions needed to obtain agreed goals. Under many 
such agreements, through integral enabling mechanisms, technical and financial assistance is provided 
to developing countries to address associated capacity constraints. Their policy space is often extended 
within these agreements. On the other hand, agreements designed to share economic opportunities, in 
areas such as trade, finance and investment, usually incorporate prohibitions against various ‘non-
competitive’ national policies and actions of parties. The policy space of developing countries can be 
constrained by these agreements when enabling mechanisms do not provide adequate extensions.  
   
The dissimilarity between agreements on social, political and environmental issues, on the one 
hand, and agreements on economic issues, on the other, arises from differences in the fundamental 
nature of these agreements: the former aim to share responsibilities among parties to address a com-
mon problem whereas the latter seek to share an opportunity between parties (Stilwell and Tarasofsky, 
2001). Reflecting this underlying difference, social, political and environmental agreements tend to 
specify what countries ‘can do’ based on their respective responsibilities relating to their role in caus-
ing a problem and their capacities to address it. In contrast, economic agreements tend to draw up 
game rules that specify what countries ‘cannot do’ in order that an opportunity is equitably shared be-
tween parties. 
   
An attempt to classify multilateral agreements according to their effect of limiting or enhancing 
national policy space for development is not clear-cut. As noted above, some multilateral agreements 
constrain national policy space, others extend it, and some may constrain it in certain areas while ex-
tending it in others. The strength of mechanisms to enforce compliance with commitments and obliga-
tions is also an important consideration. If an agreement’s policy space limiting commitments are not 
enforceable and go un-respected, the agreement cannot truly be considered to constrain national policy 
space. Whether compliance with commitments is governed by a set of benefits (carrots) and penalties 
(sticks) is thus a relevant issue when considering how effectively an international agreement may ac-
tually constrain national policy space.  
 
 
A. International agreements on environmental and social issues 
 
 Multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) are an example of agreements that usually have the 
effect of extending developing countries’ national policy space for development. MEAs identify a 
shared environmental problem of a regional or global nature to be addressed multilaterally through a 
concerted international effort. It is not only the transnational scale of these problems that necessitates a 
multilateral response, but economic considerations as well. As environmental problems are economic 
externalities, costs are associated with their internalisation, and thus few countries are willing to ad-
dress them unilaterally for fear of reducing their international competitiveness relative to countries 
taking no similar action yet benefiting from actions taken by others (free riders). The MEA, therefore, 
is an instrument through which all parties agree to establish and implement environmental policies 
based on an assurance that other parties will engage in like commitments and thus incur similar costs. 
Moreover, MEAs designed to protect ‘global commons’, often take the form of a Coasian contract be-
tween parties wherein developing countries’ willingness to accept engagements is predicated on the 8 South Centre T.R.A.D.E. Working Papers 
 
 
provision of financial assistance, often to cover full incremental costs associated with implementation, 
from developed countries (Congleton, 2001).  
   
Rather than prohibiting countries from adopting and implementing certain policies, MEAs set 
general obligations to be implemented by parties to redress environmental problems – usually through 
new national environmental policies. National policies pursuant to MEAs usually complement parties’ 
developmental objectives by improving the efficiency of natural resource management and thereby 
enhancing the sustainability of economic activities based on their use. Given the resources-intensive 
nature of many developing country economies, the prospect of obtaining international assistance for 
enhanced resource efficiency represents a primary motivation for developing countries to adopt and 
ratify MEAs. 
   
Importantly, as an integral component, most MEAs provide a framework to coordinate techni-
cal and financial cooperation to assist developing countries with limited institutional and financial ca-
pacities to implement their obligations.
3 Such frameworks were elaborated during negotiations to ad-
dress developing countries’ concerns that their ability to undertake national actions to achieve MEA 
goals is limited and that ‘new and additional’ financial and technical assistance would be required for 
their implementation of MEAs (i.e., extending their endogenous policy space).
4 In addition, reflecting 
their limited capacities for implementation, commitments of developing countries in many MEAs are 
usually designed to be less resource intensive than those of developed countries (i.e., providing them 
with an extended exogenous policy space under the MEA relative to developed countries). Such is the 
case under the Climate Convention (UNFCCC) which specifically recognises parties’ common but 
differentiated responsibilities, taking into account their specific national and regional development 
priorities, objectives and circumstances, and in the Montreal Protocol of the Vienna Convention to 
protect the Earth’s Ozone Layer, which takes into account technical and economic considerations and 
the developmental needs of developing countries. 
   
Despite their non-binding nature, MEAs with specific trade obligations (STOs) may affect na-
tional policy space for development in certain export sectors for specific chemicals and natural re-
sources, although by and large, developing countries have relatively minor exports of goods affected 
by such STOs. Only about one-tenth of the over 200 MEAs in existence contain STOs (UNEP-IISD, 
2000). STO provisions in the major MEAs restrict
5 or ban trade in: hazardous wastes (Basel Conven-
tion), endangered species of animals (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species – 
CITES), ozone-depleting substances (Montreal Protocol), hazardous chemicals and pesticides (Rotter-
dam Convention), and living genetically modified organisms (Biodiversity Convention). To date, im-
port restrictions placed on these goods by WTO members have not been formally challenged by other 
members. As such, MEAs have never resulted in a formally contended market access issue in the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body.  
   
This notwithstanding, some countries fear that a current trend to expand WTO application to 
within-the-border issues might eventually result in the use of trade sanctions to enforce MEAs 
(Bagwell and Staiger, 2001). A role for MEA governance by the WTO might not only apply to enforc-
ing STOs, but more generally to justifying various non-specific trade measures implemented by parties 
                                                 
3 For example, considerable technical and financial assistance is provided to developing countries under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the United Nations Convention on De-
sertification (UNCCD) and the United Nations Convention on Biodiversity (UNCBD), among numerous others. 
The Global Environment Facility, implemented by the UNDP, World Bank and UNEP was created in 1991 to 
finance developing countries’ participation in achieving global MEA objectives. 
4 The common negotiating positions of developing countries in MEA negotiations are expressed by the Group of 
77 and China. The G-77, currently comprising over 130 members, was established in 1964 in the context of the 
UNCTAD negotiations and now functions throughout the UN system. 
5 Aside from outright bans, other restrictions on imports prescribed by STOs include export/import licenses, noti-
fication requirements and packaging/labeling requirements. Expanding National Policy Space for Development: Why the Multilateral Trading System Must Change   9 
 
 
to advance their national commitments under MEAs, including for MEAs without STOs. This could 
further result in some WTO members’ use of trade remedies against other members, positing that the 
latter’s lower environmental standards and correspondingly lower production costs constitute a form 
of dumping. The heretofore un-approached Pandora’s box of trade restrictions based on non-product 
related process and production methods could thus be opened.
6 
   
Many multilateral agreements on social issues are closely associated with the concept of uni-
versal human rights that is integrated into the Charter of the United Nations itself through Articles 55 
and 56. No state has ever made reservations against these articles, and most adhere to the United Na-
tions Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its supplemental treaties. However, the extent to 
which parties respect their commitments by implementing international human rights instruments is 
varied (Forsythe, 2000). This is largely due to the legal status of multilateral agreements on human 
rights. They are not based on contractual or constitutive law – as are some MEAs and most trade and 
economic integration agreements – and thus they do not provide parties with either a clear incentive or 
means to enforce the terms of these agreements on other parties (Rabkin, 2000). In other words, these 
agreements have neither ‘carrots’ nor ‘sticks’. In the event of non-compliance, the most parties can do 
is publicly admonish non-compliant parties during formal conferences of the parties in an effort to 
morally persuade the latter to respect their commitments.  
   
In instances wherein parties perceive that multilateral agreements on social issues may con-
strain national policy options, they may chose to not effectively enforce national policies adopted pur-
suant to these agreements without encountering economic consequences. Examples of such breaches 
of commitments are not uncommon in developed and developing countries alike. For example, en-
forcement of national policies to support the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights – designed to ensure fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without dis-
tinction of any kind – or basic employment standards governed by International Labour Office (ILO) 
Agreements – such as freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining – confront consid-
erable imperfections in implementation. In this connection, it is noted that the majority of the countries 
in the world still fail to comply with basic ILO conventions on fundamental labour issues (Dølvik and 
Tørres, 2002). Compliance failure may occur intentionally, to reduce labour costs for national firms, or 
due to a lack of government resources needed for effective monitoring and enforcement. 
   
These dynamics suggest that although in principle national policy space on labour issues may 
be constrained following the adoption of national polices pursuant to human rights and labour agree-
ments, in practice they are constrained relatively little. However, should governance of labour stan-
dards be introduced into the WTO, members’ use of trade remedies as a means to enforce other mem-
bers’ compliance with agreements on labour-related social issues could arise (Bhagwati, 1995; 
Bagwell and Staiger, 2001). Similar to the case for MEAs, a role for WTO governance of multilateral 
agreements on labour issues would likely result in trade disputes over non-product related process and 
production methods based on the argument that non-observance of internationally agreed labour stan-




B. International trade agreements 
   
The introduction of modern transport, information and communication technologies have accelerated 
the modern globalisation process. On both regional and global scales, supranational economies have 
emerged allowing producers to access vast foreign consumption markets and thereby achieve higher 
economies of scale needed to reduce production costs and improve profit margins. On the demand 
side, consumers’ consumption frontiers have extended significantly through access to cheaper im-
                                                 
6 GATT Article III on National Treatment prohibits discrimination of imported products on basis of process and 
production methods (PPMs). 10 South Centre T.R.A.D.E. Working Papers 
 
 
ported goods and services, resulting in significantly enhanced social welfare. Attracted by the benefits 
offered by integration into supranational economies, developed and developing countries alike have 
elaborated and entered into the WTO Multilateral Trading System (MTS) and over 200 bilateral and 
regional trade agreements of a South-South, North-North and North-South nature (UNCTAD, 2003). 
This activity occurred mostly during the past two decades in step with accelerated globalisation proc-
esses.  
   
Bilateral and multilateral trade and economic integration agreements are the cornerstone of su-
pranational economies. To integrate national economies they necessarily comprise provisions affecting 
the movement of goods, labour and capital – the basic elements of an economy – and contact with 
consumers – market access. In order of increasing integration between members, trade and economic 
integration agreements include free trade areas, customs unions, common markets, and economic un-
ions. At a minimum, all of these arrangements seek to facilitate trade in goods between member states 
by reducing tariffs applied to imports from other members in an agreed way. Therefore, at the very 
least, a nation’s adherence to any integration arrangement restricts national autonomy to freely set tar-
iff levels on goods imported from other member states. However, in return, countries benefit from ex-
panded market access in other member’s economies. 
   
Participation in deeper integration arrangements, such as common markets and economic un-
ions, requires that members agree to liberalise exchanges not only in goods, but also in services and 
capital. These agreements require member states to implement agreed measures at the national level to 
facilitate the free exchange of labour and investments across national borders. Furthermore, they also 
seek to reduce non-tariff barriers to trade in goods between members. Participation in a common mar-
ket or economic union thus restricts national autonomy to make certain types of policy interventions in 
services and financial markets, and to impose non-tariff barriers on imports of goods from other mem-
bers. When monetary union is also covered by an integration arrangement, national autonomy to freely 
adopt monetary and fiscal policies, maintain fiscal deficits or intervene on interest and exchanges rates 
are also restricted. Generally, therefore, reductions in national policy space vary in proportion to the 
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began with a regional agreement for coal and steel trade among European states, the EU has evolved 
into a formal governance system covering a broad range of policy domains (Duina, 2001). Member 
states have retained little of the national policy space they possessed before their entry into the EU. 
They now share a single market, currency, competition policy, voice in international trade negotia-
tions, and common environmental, labour and health policies (Schmidt, 2003).  
   
As integration has advanced, however, there have been increasing calls by EU member states for 
increased policy flexibility to adopt and pursue policies to meet country-specific priorities, conditions 
and needs. Their ability to do this has recently become possible through ‘flexibility’ provisions in the 
EU’s Amsterdam Treaty which entered into force in May 1999. The Treaty is the first EU Agreement 
to explicitly acknowledge the principle of flexibility. Also referred to as enhanced cooperation, flexi-
bility is used to describe the situation wherein several EU member states pursue a new EU policy 
while the others stay outside the terms of this policy but remain EU members (Philippart and Sie 
Dhian Ho, 2003). While flexibility is a recent term, the mechanism had been exercised earlier; for ex-
ample, both the UK and Denmark negotiated ‘opt-outs’ from the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
during the mid-1990s. 
 
 
C. The Multilateral Trading System  
   
The Multilateral Trading System (MTS) governed by WTO Agreements represents a unique type of 
supranational economic system. It is neither a free trade area, customs union, common market nor an 
economic union, although increasingly over time has assumed qualities of each of these supranational 
economic systems. Although prior to the Uruguay Round (UR) the MTS infringed in a limited way on 
national policy autonomy – limiting its application to tariff policy – through its recent evolution since 
the UR it has increasingly infringed on national policy space. Through a number of new UR ‘within-
the-border’ agreements on subsidies, investment, services and intellectual property, the extent of this 
infringement is similar to that observed in common markets and economic unions.  
   
Do the market access benefits of the MTS outweigh its encroachment on national policy space? 
This is a question of serious debate. There is growing consensus among developing countries that any 
further loss of national policy space may seriously deprive them, particularly those with small less di-
versified economies, of access to essential development pathways. At the same time developing coun-
tries recognise the need to enhance their access to foreign markets – in both the North and South – in 
order to sustain and enhance the phenomenon of trade-led growth. 
   
The effect of MTS infringement on developing countries’ national policy space must be consid-
ered within the context of the development process itself. This process is centred upon increasing na-
tional output to raise its national income level and thereby enhance social welfare by extending the 
national consumption frontier for goods and services. Within this process, the national government 
plays a unique and central role in establishing a national policy framework capable of: building na-
tional human, technological and infrastructural capacities required to increase and diversify production 
and output; fostering enterprise formation and growth; and managing the economic, social and envi-
ronmental externalities. And only the national government has the mandate to serve these overarching 
economic functions – no other sub-national or super-national entity possesses the authority or interest 
to fulfil these responsibilities systematically at the countrywide level.  
   
In addition, it should be emphasised that development cannot be left to laissez-faire markets 
and international trade and financial systems. History has shown that market forces alone are incapa-
ble of promoting broad-based and systemic national economic development (Stiglitz, 2002). There-
fore, quite simply but dramatically, if a government fails to advance national development objectives, 
its national economy may fail to develop. This fundamental reality underscores the importance of gov-
ernments’ preservation and active use of national policy space for development. 
  Government’s access to essential development policy options hinges critically on the evolu-
tion of effective national policy space over time against the background of the country’s economic 12 South Centre T.R.A.D.E. Working Papers 
 
 
development path (UNDP, 2003). Development optimising policies need to be accessible within a 
country’s effective national policy space at the appropriate points in time as a country develops. 
Whether or not they are accessible depends upon the timing of the introduction of exogenous con-
straints through international agreements. Therefore, if the MTS, or any other international agreement, 
overly restricts national policy space during a country’s early developmental stages, it may prohibit 
that country’s access to, and implementation of, essential development policies. 
   
Limiting government support to the agriculture by reducing permitted levels of domestic sup-
port (i.e., input, output and investment subsidies) and export subsidies under the MTS provides an il-
lustrative example of how national policy space to foster development of the sector may be con-
strained. The sector is particularly important for developing countries as it provides employment to 
over 40 percent of their labour force, 1 billion workers, and sustains the nearly 60 percent of their 
population that resides in rural areas, 3 billion people, or nearly half of the world’s population (World 
Bank, 2004). Moreover, because most of developing countries’ rural population lives in poverty, rural 
development and food security remain modern-day priorities for them. 
   
At lower levels of development, most governments do not have sufficient financial resources to 
provide domestic and export subsidy support to their agricultural sector; i.e., they remain policy op-
tions that lie outside of the country’s endogenous policy space. However, as a country develops, gov-
ernment revenue grows sufficiently to place it in a position to provide this support. Generally, the 
more developed a country is, the greater the level of agricultural support it is able to provide to the 
sector. In the early 1900’s when developed countries initiated domestic and export subsidy support 
programmes, exogenous constraints were not present, and they proceeded to provide substantial sup-
port to agriculture. Then, a decade ago, as exogenous constraints emerged through the WTO Agree-
ment on Agriculture (AoA), developed countries locked-in or ‘grandfathered’ their continued provi-
sion of agricultural subsidies through commitments to marginally reduce support from their ‘estab-
lished’ or base levels. In contrast, most developing countries which notified relatively low levels of 
domestic support  in their original schedules are not permitted to subsequently raise them above their 
negotiated de minimis levels. Additionally, developing countries, who as a group reported virtually no 
use of export subsidies, are prohibited from later introducing them. 
 
Today, as many developing countries are now reaching a level of development where they are 
in a position to provide greater levels of domestic support and some measure of export subsidy support 
to agriculture, exogenous constraints deriving from the AoA are in place, substantially restricting this 
option for them. Moreover, options available to developing countries under the AoA are much more 
limited than those available to developed countries since the AoA was concluded at a time when de-
veloping countries had comparatively insignificant established levels of agricultural support from 
which not only increases are prohibited, but moreover, reductions must be made.  
   
Taking these considerations into account, the policy space dynamics of the AoA result in a 
much more limited national policy space for developing countries relative to developed countries in 
the agriculture sector. The magnitude of the difference in domestic support – as a percentage of total 
value added in the agriculture sector – between developed and developing countries is dramatic: the 
median level was only 5 per cent for over 40 developing countries notifying support to the WTO, 
whereas in developed countries it was significantly higher, climbing to levels over 60 per cent (Rob-
erts et al., 2002). Even in 2000, some six years into AoA implementation, domestic support for the 
sector in developed countries remains high. As a percentage of total value added in the sector, domes-
tic support levels in the EU, Japan and US were respectively 51, 62 and 36 per cent, levels considera-
bly higher than the developing country average which was less than 5 per cent (USDA, 2000). It 
should be emphasised that these high levels of domestic support in developed countries are entirely 
consistent with the AoA since they fall below reduction-adjusted target levels. At the same time, how-
ever, if developing countries were to raise their support to a level only slightly exceeding their de 
minimis level of 10 per cent of total production, many would be in violation of the AoA, even though 
this revised level would be substantially lower than those of developed countries. 
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Implementation of the AoA demonstrates how a specific trade agreement under the MTS, al-
though applied uniformly to all members, can affect countries differently according to the level and 
timing of their economic development (see Box 1 for further details). Other WTO agreements, includ-
ing the Subsidy and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement and the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMS), also produce differential effects on members depending on their level 
of development. 
 
The SCM Agreement permits subsidies to industry for some purposes but prohibits them for 
others.
7 A subsidy to industry can take many forms, including through direct transfers of funds, tax 
reductions or government provision of goods and services to firms, as well as through income or price 
support provided to firms for their production of goods. The SCM defines prohibited subsidies as a 
financial contribution by a government that 1) confers a ‘benefit’ to a recipient and 2) is ‘specific’ to 
an enterprise, industry or region. Furthermore, it prohibits governments from implementing national 
policies to subsidise industries contingent on their export performance (export subsidy) or upon their 
use of domestic inputs to production (local-content subsidy). However, many developing countries 
view the use of export and production-related local-content subsidies as fundamental to their economic 
diversification and development, while on the other hand, developed countries have argued that such 
subsidies are trade distorting. But although export and domestic content subsidies have been prohib-
ited for decades under the GATT and the Tokyo Round Agreement on Subsidies, prior to 1995 both 
were successfully utilised in developed countries, as well as in many East Asian developing econo-
mies, because these rules were not effectively enforceable until the establishment of the WTO and en-
try into force of the SCM (Steger, 2003).
8  
 
Non-specific subsidies provided for research, regional development, or adaptation to environ-
mental requirements, are permitted under the SCM. However, despite a scope for permitted subsidies 
under the SCM, rulings by dispute settlement panels suggest that any subsidy may be brought into dis-
pute if it has the effect of supporting exports. This presents a particular problem to developing coun-
tries wherein many of industries with the greatest potential for growth and employment are export-
oriented due to small, immature or saturated domestic markets. Developing countries may also have 
difficulties providing ‘non-actionable’ subsidies for regional development, since beneficiaries are of-
ten active in only one economic sector or a single geographical region, and thus such subsidy support 
may be challenged as being ‘specific’. By contrast, in larger developed countries the need for ‘export-
supporting’ subsidies is less critical since domestic markets are dynamic and sufficiently large relative 
to scale economies, allowing developed countries’ subsidy-recipient firms to develop substantially 












                                                 
7 Subsidy disciplines under the SCM apply to all goods except agricultural goods. The latter are covered sepa-
rately under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. 
8 Since export and production subsidies are largely prohibited under the SCM, many developing countries re-
main reluctant to reduce tariffs and tariff bindings since these remain as the only means to provide ‘support’, 
albeit indirect and less effective than direct subsidy support, to strategic industries. As a result, the SCM has had 
the perverse effect of impeding progress in trade liberalisation negotiations. 14 South Centre T.R.A.D.E. Working Papers 
 
 
   
Developing countries are also at a relative disadvantage because non-actionable subsidies for 
R&D and environmental adaptation permitted under the SCM are generally important requirements for 
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The WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) has a differential effect on members’ effective national policy space in 
the agriculture sector. Prior to introduction of the AoA, exogenous constraints were absent so the effective na-
tional policy space (Ef-PS) and endogenous policy space (En-PS) for agriculture were identical. Providing subsidies 
(i.e., domestic support and export subsidies) to the agriculture sector was within developed countries’ Ef-PS but 
largely outside of developing countries Ef-PS. Developed countries provided significant subsidy support to the sec-
tor but developing countries did not. During the period of AoA implementation, developing countries’ endoge-
nous capacities increased and so En-PS has expanded to include their potential to provide subsidy support. How-
ever, their exogenous policy space (Ex-PS) was reduced substantially by the AoA since imposed subsidy reduction 
commitments were set relative to the low levels of support they provided before introduction of the AoA. As a re-
sult, developing countries are only permitted to provide limited subsidy support to the sector ex-post. For developed 
countries the situation is markedly different. Ex-PS was also reduced by the AoA, but relatively little since AoA 
subsidy reduction commitments were set relative to the high levels of subsidies they provided before AoA imple-
mentation. As a result, developed countries are permitted to continue providing substantial subsidy support to the 
sector ex-post. The AoA therefore generates a larger effective national policy space, and establishes higher maxi-
mum allowed levels of subsidy support, for developed countries than developing countries. 
 
Box 1: Effective national policy space under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture Expanding National Policy Space for Development: Why the Multilateral Trading System Must Change   15 
 
 
firms’ competitiveness in advanced industrial sectors which prevail in developed countries. For in-
stance, R&D is important for the computer software, aerospace, chemical and pharmaceutical indus-
tries where developed country firms are major global players, and relatively unimportant in sectors 
such as textiles and clothing and basic commodities where developing countries have comparative ad-
vantages. Moreover, in sectors where R&D is important, it leads to patents, which guarantee devel-
oped country firms a price setting ability for downstream products, allowing them to lock-in signifi-
cant earnings when products are eventually produced and exported, with intellectual property pro-
tected by the WTO TRIPS Agreement  
    
Apart from subsidies, government policies can also use non-subsidy means of supporting na-
tional economic development. Investment policies, which can used in this regard, place performance 
requirements on foreign investment. Prior to the Uruguay Round Agreements, these requirements in-
cluded local-content and export value-added requirements that enhance national development through 
linkages and spillover with domestic firms and though skill and technology transfer. Performance re-
quirements also required foreign investors to export a certain percentage of their production and thus 
contribute to a country’s foreign exchange earnings. However, since 1994, the WTO Agreement on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) prevents such performance requirements, and a number 
of others, from being placed on foreign investments, leaving little room for developing countries to 
design national investment policies that can help ensure positive development linkages and spillovers 
from foreign investment.  
   
This brief discussion of the AoA, SCM and TRIMS agreements demonstrates that even though 
a trade agreement’s rules may apply equally to all parties, the constraints they impose on national pol-
icy space will affect the development prospects of countries very differently depending on their level 
of economic development. While there is no universal prescription for economic development, the 
experience of many developed countries indicates that many national policies that are now branded as 
trade-distorting policies by developed countries, and prohibited by WTO rules, have played a critical 
role in fostering capital accumulation, building sectoral comparative advantages, and stimulating eco-
nomic diversification and sustainable growth in the developed world (Chang, 2002; Baldwin, 2003; 
Rodrik, 2003). Moreover, once these results have been achieved, many of these national policies can 
be safely abandoned. Thus, while developed countries may no longer require the use of such policies 
to sustain their economic growth, they remain essential to catalyse economic diversification and 
growth and development in many developing countries.  
   
At higher stages of development, developed countries no longer need the extended policy space 
that they required in the past. They may thus seek to lock in their gains through a negotiated trade 
agreement that limits other similarly developed countries from maintaining so called ‘trade-distorting’ 
policies (UNDP, 2003). Unfortunately – intentionally or unintentionally – uniformly applied policy 
space restrictions imposed by new multilateral trade agreements necessarily have the effect of prevent-
ing developing countries from pursuing many growth-critical policies used earlier by developed coun-
tries, thus locking-out developing countries prospects for growth, not only by reducing their capacity 
to participate in global export markets but in their own national markets as well (Chang, 2002). 
   
If an equitable trading system is to be achieved, these considerations suggest that the timing and 
sequencing of trade liberalisation must be carefully matched to a country’s level of economic devel-
opment, and that a one-size and one-time fits all approach to trade liberalisation cannot serve the de-
velopment aspirations of developing countries (Rodrik 2001; UNCTAD, 2003; UNDP, 2003). Reflect-
ing this view, negotiators of developed and developing countries alike have suggested that WTO 
members should recognise that members’ national policy preferences differ, and to promote more 
open and rule-based trade, emphasis should be placed a balanced articulation of policy choices rather 
than on an imposition of a single standard. Moreover, referring to the development aspirations of de-
veloping countries, the EU has officially stated that “developing countries should maintain their right 
and policy space to pursue their policies and that no international agreement should prevent them from 
doing so” (EU, 2003).  
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What are some of the growth-critical national policies that developing countries require to sup-
port economic development? They are policies that provide support to national industries, over limited 
periods of time, to stimulate investment, production, build competitive export capacity and promote 
economic diversification. In broad terms they may include policies to: 
 
♦  subsidise specific agricultural and industrial sectors, particularly for small and medium 
size enterprises (SMEs), including through production and export subsidies and grants, 
wherein governments seek to build national comparative advantages, and to advance eco-
nomic diversification; 
♦  provide financial support to national industries in economic difficulty, or to those under-
taking major capital investments; 
♦  maintain higher import tariffs and impose import limitations (through quotas and tempo-
rary bans) on goods whose production provides significant levels of national employment 
and/or is required to pursue poverty reduction efforts and sub-national regional develop-
ment objectives; 
♦  mandate the procurement of nationally produced goods and services, when available, by 
foreign multinationals and national government entities in order to promote SME devel-
opment; 
♦  recognise and protect traditional knowledge to encourage entrepreneurship in rural com-
munities; 
♦  ensure high levels of local content and domestic participation in foreign investment pro-
jects, not only to ensure related national employment, but more so, to build national hu-
man capacities; 
♦  ensure minimum levels of technology transfer in foreign investment projects to build na-
tional human and technological capacities, 
♦  ensure minimum levels of service are provided to poor and minority groups by foreign 
service providers establishing themselves in national markets; 
♦  restrict large and abrupt movements of investment capital to prevent economic instability; 
♦  maintain government-supported domestic pricing schemes on essential goods and services 
consumed by the poor. 
   
 
These are just examples of the many growth-critical national policies that have been, or risk being, 
placed outside of the policy space boundaries of developing countries by international trade and in-
vestment agreements.  
 
 
Special and Differential Treatment within the MTS 
 
Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT), a fundamental principle that all WTO agreements are 
built upon, serves to accommodate members’ development needs within the trading system (Youssef, 
1999). Lacking comparable economic, structural and institutional endowments in trade and trade re-
lated areas, developing countries require less policy-restrictive WTO obligations than their developed 
country counterparts. S&DT allows developing countries greater flexibility to implement national de-
velopment policies that enhance the supply capacity and competitiveness of domestic enterprises. Fur-
thermore, not yet having achieved substantial and sustained growth of their share in world exports, 
particularly for value-added goods and services, developing countries require greater special and dif-
ferentiated rights that provide them with capacity building assistance and more favourable terms for 
exporting their goods and services to global markets.  
 
Special and Differential Treatment within the MTS remains developing countries’ preferred 
mechanism to improve and restore national policy space for development. S&DT is an established 
principle in WTO – dating back to provisions provided under the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs 
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within the MTS. Until the Uruguay Round of negotiations in 1994 the MTS trade agenda was confined 
to trade in goods, and S&DT under GATT 1947 provided developing countries with flexibility in the 
use of tariffs, quotas and other import measures to shelter specific domestic industries from import 
competition, and to discourage a broad range of imports when confronted by large trade deficits and 
balance of payment difficulties.  
 
As an integral part of the MTS, Articles XVIII, XXVIII bis of GATT 1947 provided developing 
countries with flexibility to derogate from GATT commitments and obligations for limited time peri-
ods in order to support development objectives. Article XVIII provided developing countries with a 
wide range of options to support national industries, including through implementing tariff protection 
and government assistance initiatives required for the establishment of a particular industry; and quan-
titative restrictions on imports for balance of payments purposes. Article XXVIII bis of GATT 1947 
recognises that the success of multilateral negotiations depends on the participation of all contracting 
parties, and that negotiations shall take into account the needs of less-developed countries for a more 
flexible use of tariff protection to assist their economic development and meet the special needs of 
these countries to maintain tariffs for revenue purposes. 
 
Largely through efforts initiated by developing countries during UNCTAD I in 1964 (South 
Centre, 2004 A), Part IV of the GATT on Trade and Development was elaborated in 1965 introducing 
the principle of non-reciprocity for developing countries in MTS negotiations in order to address diffi-
culties they experience in integrating into international markets. And later, in 1979, resulting from the 
Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations, the Enabling Clause established a framework to provide devel-
oping countries with differential and more favourable treatment through the members’ introduction of 
trade preferences for developing countries, including through preferential market access provided by 
developed countries under the Generalised System of Preferences. 
 
During the pre-1994 period, when the scope of the MTS was largely limited to border measures 
affecting trade in goods, national policy space for development was not significantly restricted by the 
MTS, and the above S&DT provisions were largely viewed as providing sufficient flexibility in the 
area of import restrictions and related policies, although serious concerns were raised over the diffi-
culty in effectively implementing these S&DT provisions due to cumbersome rules of procedure and 
the need to secure approval from, and in some cases compensate, other trading partners.  
 
More recently, however, the MTS regime has expanded dramatically in scope. As discussed 
above, an array of new WTO Agreements, such as the AoA, SCM, TRIMs and GATS, among others, 
adopted following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994, and ‘New Understandings’ of the 
GATT 1947 provisions accompanying the establishment of the WTO, extended the influence of WTO 
measures from members’ borders to their national economic policy regimes. This transformation, 
however, was largely asymmetric as the Uruguay Round did little to extend the offering S&DT provi-
sions into new within-the-border areas governed by the WTO regime (Tortora, 2003). At the same 
time, with the formation of the WTO, the formal and legally binding Dispute Settlement Agreement 
curtailed the ability of developing countries to interpret and apply GATT S&DT provisions in a flexi-
ble manner to support their implementation of pro-development policies (Stevens, 2003).  
 
With the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the de-jure mis-en-place of a single undertaking 
approach to the WTO Agreements through the Final Act and the emergence of a formal dispute set-
tlement system, the principle and practical applicability of S&DT was significantly eroded and trans-
formed. The wide scope and integrated nature of S&DT in GATT 1947 was not replicated in the Uru-
guay Round Agreements. Appearing only as an ‘add-ons’ in these agreements, S&DT has largely 
taken the form of a transitional device providing developing countries with longer timeframes to im-
plement their commitments and only slightly reduced obligations vis-à-vis developed countries. More-
over, the technical assistance measures designed to respond to developing countries capacity building 
needs for a ‘single undertaking’ implementation of all of the Uruguay Round agreements are only ac-
corded on a best-endeavour basis by developed countries.  
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Because S&DT has not evolved in parallel with new far-reaching within-the-border commit-
ments under this transition, most developing countries are demanding that S&DT assume an integral 
role in all WTO Agreements similar to the one it has in GATT 1947 by substantially upgrading it to 
restore much of the national policy space for development that has been lost since the conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round and establishment of the WTO (Corrales-Leal et al., 2003).  
 
Certainly the MTS transition to within-the-border domains has greatly reduced the exogenous 
policy space of developing countries, severely restricting their ability to provide support to their indus-
tries, build domestic supply capacity, and promote economic diversification through active policy in-
terventions. For the majority of developing countries, therefore, more effective S&DT provisions to 
reopen and extend their policy space are of critical and essential value. 
 
 
D. The International Financial System 
   
Loan and grant agreements with international finance institutions (IFI) such as the World Bank and 
IMF are ostensibly designed to promote development in recipient developing countries. IFI aid pro-
grammes (often in the form of structural adjustment programmes) provide developing countries with 
useful assistance in building national institutional and infrastructural resources needed to overcome 
endogenous constraints that limit national policy space. However, at the same time, these programmes 
often impose significant exogenous policy constraints on recipient developing countries through priva-
tisation and trade and investment liberalisation conditionalities.  
   
The debt crisis of the early 1980s provided a major motivation for the World Bank and the IMF 
to require trade policy reform as a conditionality for developing country loans. IFI conditionalities 
were and remain largely based on policy recommendations known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ 
(UNDP, 2003). These conditionalities – requiring ambitious privatisation and liberalisation of capital 
accounts and trade in developing countries that leave a very limited role for government intervention 
in markets – have often met mixed results (Stiglitz, 2002) and a comprehensive assessment of IFI con-
ditionalities shows their extensive intrusiveness into borrowing governments’ ability to use industrial 
policy as a tool for development (Dreher, 2002).
9 
   
According to adherents of the Washington Consensus, there are many arguments against the 
state playing a role in the economy. They argue that government is harmful, ineffective, and unneces-
sary (Stiglitz, 1997). However, history portrays a different picture. Rather than impeding growth in 
Korea, Thailand, Singapore and other East Asian economies, governments’ active intervention through 
industrial policy, primarily export promotion, played a central role in catalysing rapid economic 
growth in East Asia over the past two decades (World Bank, 1993). More recently, China and India – 
where government intervention is particularly strong – have joined their ranks. In stark contrast, the 
market-based laissez faire approach prescribed by the IMF, World Bank and WTO for many African 
and Latin American countries over the same period, was followed with disastrous results. Broad-based 
liberalisation resulted in severe import surges, drastic declines in domestic production and high levels 
of unemployment (Buffie, 2001). In summary, most developing countries followed the doctors’ pre-
scription and, in many cases, did not feel better (Stiglitz, 1997). Now these same countries seek to re-
                                                 
9 Of the 156 developing countries (low and middle income countries in the World Bank classification system), 
136 (87 per cent of them) were extended credit by the World Bank Group through IBRD loans, structural ad-
justment lending programs and IDA credit. According to the World Bank, loan conditionalities related to interna-
tional trade account for almost 16 percent of all conditionalities and were included in 79 percent of World Bank 
programs between1980-88. Where assistance from the IMF is concerned, 118 developing countries (76 per cent) 
received assistance from the IMF between 1980 and 2000, including through trust fund loans and credit provided 
under the IMF’s structural adjustment and enhanced structural adjustment facilities. For the IMF’s programs, 
between 1987 and 2000, about 15 per cent of all loan conditionalities were trade-related (for further details, see 
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assert their own self-care approach to economic management, largely based on the positive experi-
ences of their Asian counterparts. Not surprisingly, they thus seek policy space, and lots of it.  
 
This is not to suggest that developing countries advocate a return to their state-run or state-
dominated economies of the past. Rather they seek to restore government’s ability work in partnership 
with private enterprise to promote diversification and build national export capacities, not only as in 
successful Asian economies, but also as in the EU, Japan, US and other developed countries.  
   
In developed countries, this partnership is particularly advanced. Developed country govern-
ments run trade seminars, provide export finance and tax incentives, conduct market studies, and de-
liver technical assistance to companies that wish to enter foreign markets (Schweke, 1999). More sig-
nificantly, developed country governments are actively involved in extending export guarantees and 
credits for goods and services exported by their firms. In 2000, developed country export credit agen-
cies had a total stock of 500 $b in outstanding guarantees to their firms operating in developing coun-
tries, and issued 58 $b worth of new export credits for goods and services exported by their firms 
(World Bank, 2002; OECD, 2002).  
   
From a strategic perspective also, developed country governments actively support their firms 
through research and development (R&D) support aimed at maintaining leadership in key goods and 
services exports. In the US alone, research and development R&D grants and subsidies totalled 117 $b 
in 2003 (AAAS, 2003), much of which, either directly or indirectly, supports the activities of US firms 
(Edwards and DeHaven, 2002). R&D support also drives much of the innovation and generates much 
of the intellectual property that US state-of-the-art technologies – sold throughout the world – are 
based upon.  
   
The above figures illustrate the substantial amount of support provided to developed country 
firms through financial support mechanisms that are instrumental in facilitating and sustaining devel-
oped country exports. It should be noted that neither export guarantees and credits nor R&D support 
are classified as production or export subsidies, and that governments’ use of each of these policy in-
struments is entirely consistent with WTO disciplines.  
   
There is an abundance of other examples of governments playing a central role in ‘industry 
building’ in developed countries. For instance, in the aerospace sector, the European Airbus Consor-
tium was launched with considerable and sustained financial support from several EU countries 
(France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom) to make it the world’s largest aerospace company 
today. The Airbus story not only demonstrates how governments can work with the private sector to 
build an infant industry and help it enter global markets, but moreover, it shows how several countries’ 
policymakers and private sectors can work together in a multi-country consortium – an approach 
largely unexploited by, but offering considerable potential to developing countries. 
   
The World Bank has emphasised that a government that encourages and complements the ac-
tivities of private businesses is an essential ingredient in economic development. An effective state is 
vital for sustainable development, both economic and social. Experience shows that the state is central 
to economic and social development, not as a direct provider of growth, but as its partner, catalyst, and 
facilitator (World Bank, 1997; Rodrik, 2004; Tabellini, 2004). For developing countries in particular, a 
recent communiqué of the World Bank and IMF Development Committee has stated that sustainable 
and inclusive growth needs to be accelerated in many developing countries, and that specific priorities 
must be determined at the country level in the context of country-owned and monitored development 
strategies (World Bank / IMF, 2004).  
   
Most governments recognise the need to implement policies and actions that support national 
industries as an important government function. Through grants, subsides, preferential loans and tariff 
barriers on certain goods, developed country governments have and continue to provide support to 
industry as one of their primary functions. Without the means to provide financial support, many de-
veloping countries have relied on tariff protection as an indirect means to support their industries. 20 South Centre T.R.A.D.E. Working Papers 
 
 
Now, however, as some are approaching levels of economic development where they are beginning to 
attain levels of national income that permit them to form durable partnerships with their industries, 
including by providing them with financial support, MTS rules and IFI conditionalities are increas-
ingly limiting their ability to do so, while at the same time impelling them to reduce protective tariffs 
applied to imports which may be needed to protect sensitive industries by establishing economies of 
scale, and to generate government revenue. Approaches to ensure adequate national policy space for 
development remain essential if developing countries are to move beyond this impasse.  
 
IV.  W AYS TO BETTER UTILISE AND ENHANCE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ POLICY 
SPACE 




When developing countries’ development objectives are being considered, it is important to assess 
how much national policy space is currently available to them. Is it adequate to advance development 
objectives? Does it permit governments to work in partnership with national industries, including 
through national policy instruments that confer economic support to firms? What needs to be done at 
the national and international levels to ensure that it is effectively utilised? Finally, if national policy 
space is overly constrained, blocking many essential national policy options, what can be done to en-
hance it?  
   
In assessing the scope and extent of national policy space, both endogenous and exogenous 
constraints need to be evaluated within the context of specific policy options that a government desires 
to implement. Once endogenous and exogenous constraints are mapped-out and possible enabling 
measures, including S&DT within the MTS,
10 are accounted for, how much of the policy universe re-
mains accessible to policymakers? Are effective national policy options accessible within a govern-
ment’s effective national policy space? If they are, policy space constraints may not be at issue, and 
national governments need to use available space more effectively. However, if they are not, policy-




A. Expanding endogenous policy space  
   
In many cases, it is endogenous, rather than exogenous, constraints that render desirable policy options 
inaccessible. In such instances, international agreements do not restrict access to the policies under 
consideration. For example, the national budget may be insufficient to implement a policy option, or 
institutional and infrastructural resources may be insufficient to support effective policy implementa-
tion. Alternatively, the government may lack knowledge of, or commitment to, new development 
schemes and appropriate policies to advance them. Whatever their source, endogenous constraints 
need to be addressed by a long-term national development plan.  
 
Development partners – namely the IFIs, regional development banks, international organisa-
tions and both bi- and multi-lateral assistance agencies – have a significant capacity building role to 
play in assisting developing country governments address endogenous policy space constraints. Al-
though a great deal of capacity building assistance is already being provided by the WTO, IFIs and 
UN organisations in this area, much more remains to be done. New and improved S&DT under the 
WTO should also be developed to help address trade-related endogenous constraints wherever appro-
priate, particularly in the areas where developing countries with limited institutional resources to im-
plement and comply with WTO agreements need greater assistance. Such areas include simplifying 
rules of origin; increasing channels for the transfer of technology; and, assisting developing countries 
to comply with product standards. 
                                                 
10 In 2000, a total of 145 Special and Differential Treatment provisions were included in the WTO Agreements. 
For comprehensive compilation and discussion of these provisions, see WTO, 2000. An additional 27 S&DT 
provisions were adopted in 2003 during the 5
th WTO Ministerial Conference. 
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B. Expanding exogenous policy space 
   
When endogenous policy space is adequate, exogenous policy constraints that block access to desir-
able policy options are often identified as limiting national policy space, even when existing enabling 
mechanisms, such as S&DT, are taken into account. When an exogenous constraint has its origin in 
IFI conditionalities, lender governments should relax their loan requirements. The IFIs are now listen-
ing closely to client countries and are more open to modifying conditionalities to ensure country own-
ership of IFI assistance packages. When the exogenous constraint has its origin in WTO rules, existing 
S&DT provisions need to be re-examined and improved.  
 
As WTO members agreed in the Doha Declaration, “concerns expressed regarding their opera-
tion in addressing specific constraints faced by developing countries, particularly least-developed 
countries, need to be addressed by members, and therefore all S&DT provisions should be reviewed 
with a view to strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational.”  
 
Key areas where improved S&DT would be beneficial are: expanding the scope of non-
actionable subsidies in production and export-related areas; permitting broader application of perform-
ance requirements for trade-related investment; permitting the designation of ‘special products’ – es-
sential for economic diversification, food and livelihood security, and rural development – on which 
lower than average tariff reductions can be applied; and, liberalizing the use of special safeguard 
measures to temporarily increase tariffs to protect domestic producers from abrupt import surges of 
nationally sensitive goods and services. Moreover, the Doha Declaration also emphasises that current 
Round negotiations “shall take fully into account the special needs and interests of developing and 
least developed country participants, including through less than full reciprocity in reduction commit-
ments,” setting the basis to provide additional exogenous policy space to developing countries as an 
integral and automatic component of the commitment process and outside of any resort to S&DT pro-
visions that only come into effect following an application to them by developing countries under spe-
cial prescribed circumstances. For their part, developing countries maintain that ongoing trade negotia-
tions must respond substantively to the above mandates of the Doha Declaration if the Round is to 
reach a successful outcome (TWN, 2004).  
   
It is important to stress that removing exogenous policy constraints does not imply developing 
countries will fall out of compliance with their IFI loan commitments, or call for a roll-back of WTO 
agreements and rules which they have accepted and seek to implement and comply with. Rather, more 
flexible IFI conditionalities and more effective S&DT are in fact approaches to ensure that developing 
countries can comply with IFI conditionalities and WTO rules. They also enhance policy coherence 
among IFI and WTO agreements which are, a priori, established upon a fundamental premise of ad-
vancing global economic development. 
 
 
C. Non-expansionary approaches 
   
In instances when the underlying situation prompting their need for greater national policy space can 
be resolved through actions taken by developed countries, developing countries may not require any 
expansion of their policy space at all. Addressing certain developing countries’ outstanding WTO im-
plementation issues can contribute significantly to eliminating their need for additional policy space. 
Many of these issues, currently under negotiation, involve problems encountered as a result of devel-
oped countries’ implementation of their own commitments, or lack thereof. Among these issues are: 
unremitting domestic support for agriculture; growing indiscriminate use of antidumping measures to 
restrict imports from developing countries; the persistence of peak and escalating tariffs on goods of 
significant export interest to developing countries; limited commitments to open services markets of 
export interest to developing countries; and, failure to effectively implement existing S&DT provi-
sions of the WTO agreements. Progress in resolving these issues could significantly reduce the scope 
and degree of exogenous policy space requested by developing countries through additional S&DT. 
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Finally, another option may be for WTO members to consider, in addition to S&DT for devel-
oping countries, special and differential commitments (SDC) for developed countries. Through SDCs, 
developed countries would voluntarily assume commitments to promote imports from developing 
countries by providing special and more favourable conditions for developing country exports on a 
non-, or less than full, reciprocity basis. 
 
While SDCs would represent a new mechanism within the WTO, as noted earlier, the principle 
of such a mechanism is now solidly based in international law. Precedents include both the 
UNFCCC’s principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ and the EU Amsterdam Conven-
tion’s principle of ‘flexibility’ or enhanced cooperation. SDCs within the WTO would allow devel-
oped countries (or a subset of them) to make special commitments on a voluntary basis to facilitate 
access of developing countries to their markets by reducing not only tariff barriers, but a wide range of 
non-tariff barriers as well.  
   
Because SDCs would be an integral part of WTO Agreements to which all members are parties, 
they would be differentiated from plurilateral agreements and extra-WTO bilateral and multilateral 
free trade agreements. This would allow all developing country WTO members to benefit from SDCs, 
rather than restricting benefits to members that are parties to separate plurilateral or extra-WTO free 
trade agreements. SDCs would also be distinguished from generalised systems of preferences (GSP) 
schemes by addressing, in addition to tariffs, a number of within-the-border issues. From a practical 
perspective, integrating SDCs into WTO Agreements could reduce motivations for additional North-
South bilateral and regional trade agreements, and lead to a strengthened central role of the MTS 
within the wider international trading system.  
 





The strength and sustainability of the global economy depends on mutually beneficial economic part-
nerships between increasingly interdependent nations. These must be partnerships through which the 
needs and interests of all partners are served, and through which the economic welfare all partners are 
improved. To guide the development of such partnerships, the 2000 United Nations Millennium De-
velopment Declaration call for a ‘Global Partnership for Development’ supported by “an open, equita-
ble, rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system”. This is precisely the 
type of trading system the majority of WTO members are working to strengthen through the ongoing 
Doha Round of trade negotiations. 
 
The WTO Ministerial Declaration, adopted in Doha in November 2001, represents an important 
step forward to bring development issues to the fore in WTO negotiations. In Doha, WTO members 
agreed to make positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries secure a share in the 
growth of world trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development, including through 
enhanced market access for their exports, and that negotiations shall take fully into account the special 
needs and interests of developing and least developed countries, including through less than full recip-
rocity in reduction commitments. By integrating the development dimension into multilateral trade 
negotiations, the Doha Round provides a unique opportunity to help build a ‘Global Partnership for 
Development’. But to seize this opportunity, all those engaged in negotiations need to work coopera-
tively to integrate members’ development needs into the agreements and provisions that will ulti-
mately be adopted. 
 
At UNCTAD XI in July 2004, following two and a half years of protracted Doha Round nego-
tiations that saw little progress in achieving consensual results, developing countries argued that nego-
tiating progress can best be achieved by responding to their need for expanded policy space (South 
Centre, 2004 B). By definition, trade liberalisation requires countries to reduce barriers to trade, and 
for trade in goods, this often implies that participants reduce tariffs. Tariff reduction is, therefore, a 
central element of market access negotiations on agricultural and non-agricultural goods. But this is 
where the problem begins. 
 
In a world free of market distortions in which all trading partners share comparable endow-
ments of technological, human and financial capital and possess sufficient comparative advantage in 
tradable goods needed to achieve balanced trade in global markets, tariff reduction, voir tariff elimina-
tion, benefits all. Unfortunately, the world is not so utopian, and many developing countries have 
learned that appropriately set tariffs remain necessary; not only achieve economic growth in an open 
global economy, but for many of them, to merely survive.  
 
 
A. Protective policy space 
 
In the real world of unequal partners, fair trade rules are critical to ensure developing countries of their 
ability to protect their economies if things go wrong. This does not imply that trade liberalisation can-
not proceed, but only that it must be accompanied by trade rules that allow developing countries to 
protect national industries when they find themselves on the wrong side of global market equilibria. 
As was clearly recognised almost 60 years ago by the drafters of the GATT, when sharp tariff reduc-
tions result in unmanageable import surges, sharp increases in unemployment and balance of payment 
difficulties, governments need to act to restore economic stability to national economies. This reality 
points to the need for emergency safeguards. S&DT provisions must be integrated into the Doha Expanding National Policy Space for Development: Why the Multilateral Trading System Must Change   25 
 
 
Round market access negotiations on both agricultural and non-agricultural goods to provide develop-
ing countries with confidence that they will be legally empowered to sufficiently raise tariffs in times 
of trouble. While negotiations aimed at broad-based reductions of tariff bindings have included pro-
posals for emergency safeguard mechanisms, expectations for their scope remain divergent. Negotia-
tions might thus consider not only bound and applied tariff rates for all traded goods, but also a poten-
tially new category of emergency-bindings that developing countries can maintain at levels above lib-
eralised bound rates and resort to under negotiated conditions clearly specified in relevant S&DT safe-
guard provisions.  
 
Moreover, to avoid even finding themselves on the wrong side of global market equilibria, de-
veloping countries should retain the option to selectively exclude a sizable portion of goods from 
broad-based tariff reductions in the first place. This is precisely the rationale behind ‘special products’ 
of national production and export interest as introduced in both agricultural and non-agricultural mar-
ket access negotiations. S&DT provisions must provide developing countries to have a free hand in 
independently selecting a fair number of special products which they can exclude from tariff reduc-
tion. Such a provision should not trouble trading partners, because governments will logically only 
select as special products those goods that they have production and export capacities in, and they will 
certainly reduce tariffs on a wide range of goods that they seek to import more efficiently. And be-
cause there is significant production and export specialisation in the global marketplace, all partici-
pants will inevitably find significant new export destinations in liberalised markets, even after an ex-
clusion of special products is discounted. The risk of pursuing a comprehensive and nearly all inclu-
sive approach to tariff liberalisation, allowing few and limited special product exceptions, is that nego-
tiations are likely to fail. Developed country demandeurs should recognise that such an ‘all or nothing’ 
approach holds every possibility to result in ‘nothing’. As the Seattle and Cancun Ministerials have 
clearly demonstrated, developing countries prefer no deal to a bad deal, and they will be entirely con-
tent to return home from Hong Kong with a null result rather than one which deprives them of suffi-
cient policy space to protect their national industries. 
 
Liberalisation of trade in services is also a major focus of the Doha negotiations. As with goods, 
developing countries will seek selective liberalisation of trade in services. However, unlike market 
access negotiations based on the AoA and GATT, market access negotiations in services permit, a pri-
ori, developing countries to limit the sectoral scope of liberalisation by virtue of the flexible structure 
of the GATS (Gibbs, 1998). Under Article XIX of the GATS, market access and national treatment 
can be limited to selected service sector or sub-sector and thus permit developing countries to pursue a 
gradual approach to liberalisation. The GATS further provides developing countries with the option of 
restricting liberalisation to a limited number of sectors and modes of supply and, when providing en-
hanced market access available to foreign service suppliers, to attach conditions aimed at achieving 
development objectives such as strengthening their domestic services capacity, efficiency and com-
petitiveness and improving their access to technology, distribution channels and information networks. 
 
By providing developing countries with the flexibility to advance their services liberalisation in 
a phased and selective manner, the GATS continues to be viewed by most as a development friendly 
agreement. Notwithstanding this viewpoint, many remain concerned that in bilateral request and offer 
negotiations with developed countries that they will pressured into opening their services markets so 
extensively that the viability of their nascent domestic industries may be put at risk.  
 
Developing countries also seek a safety valve against unexpectedly high services imports surges 
through an emergency safeguard mechanism (ESM). Because an ESM would provide them with ac-
cess to protective policy space, it would raise their confidence level to assume aggressive services lib-
eralisation commitments. As with trade in goods, developing countries are thus clearly signalling that 
they are willing to engage in services liberalisation negotiations provided that the flexibilities under 
the GATS are respected and they are allowed to have recourse to protective policy space if things go 
wrong ex post to any services liberalisation commitments.  
 




Protective policy space alone constitutes only half of developing countries’ recipe for success in the 
global economy. In a world of unequal trading partners, fair trade rules are needed not only to provide 
developing countries with the ability to protect their national industries if things go wrong, but also to 
support their national industries so that things might go right in the first place. As all developed coun-
tries have learned, the provision of government assistance to domestic industries – particularly small 
and medium size enterprises (SMEs) – through public-private partnerships is crucial to ensure their 
competitiveness, not only in global markets, but in domestic markets as well.  
 
The emphasis on providing government support to SMEs is important. In developed and devel-
oping countries alike, relative to large firms, SMEs face similar challenges due to their small size, lack 
of financial and technological capital, and limited access to information, distribution and marketing 
resources. In developed countries, governments provide substantial assistance to SMEs to enhance 
their international competitiveness (OECD, 2000). Certainly in developing countries where SMEs ac-
count for a significantly higher share of national employment and export earnings (Van Houtte, 1997) 
the case for government assistance is even more critical. Without it, developing countries’ continued 
export diversification into higher added value manufactures may falter. Yet as this support is begin-
ning to materialise in some developing countries, including through the provision of subsidies, the 
question arises whether developed countries will resort to trade remedies or challenge such support in 
the WTO as developing countries’ SMEs’ competitiveness increases in the future.  
 
Clear and operational provisions permitting developing countries to provide support, including 
through subsidies, to their enterprises (small, medium, or large) are needed. S&DT provisions must be 
improved to ensure developing countries’ access to sufficient policy space for industry support. Unlike 
S&DT provisions needed to provide developing countries with protective policy space which can be 
placed directly in the market access agreements currently under negotiation (e.g. on agriculture, non-
agricultural goods, and services), S&DT provisions designed to provide supportive policy space will 
likely need to be developed in the SCM, TRIMS, and TRIPS (and potentially the Anti-Dumping) 
Agreements. Developing countries will thus need to continue to engage proactively in the WTO Rules 
negotiations and the more general S&DT negotiations underway in the Special Sessions of the WTO 
Committee on Trade and Development, in order to ensure that S&DT provisions resulting from the 







Development optimising policies need to be accessible within a country’s effective national policy 
space at appropriate points in time to stimulate and reinforce national economic development. In par-
ticular, adequate policy space is needed for developing countries to implement national policies that 
protect and support the development of domestic industries and greater diversification of the economy.  
 
The growing perception that international trade and economic agreements may overly restrict 
national policy space options for developing countries should be more seriously considered by the in-
ternational community, and additional policy space should be provided within the framework of exist-
ing multilateral commitments and obligations. As called for in the Doha Declaration, greater emphasis 
should be placed within the MTS on addressing specific constraints faced by developing countries 
through S&DT provisions by strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and opera-
tional.  
 
WTO members should also recognise that their national policy needs and preferences differ, 
and to promote more open and rule-based trade, agreements could offer a balanced array of policy op-
tions for developing countries to choose from rather than imposing a single, often developed country, 
standard. At the same time, when negotiating new multilateral agreements, developing countries 
should carefully assess the policy space implications of all provisions under negotiations and refrain 
from accepting development-restrictive commitments. They should also demand supplementary ena-
bling mechanisms and/or S&DT provisions permitting exceptions from restrictive disciplines based on 
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